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CORPORATE LAW-CLASH OF THE CONCEPTS:
WHEN FIDUCIARY DUTIES OVERCOME
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS IN CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS-SELMARK ASSOCS.,
INC. V EHRLICH, 5 N.E.3D 923 (MASS. 2014).
In Massachusetts, shareholders in closely held ("close")
corporations owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and to each other, and
the relationship among the shareholders of a close corporation "must be
one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to
succeed."'
However, shareholders' rights and obligations under an
agreement regarding the close corporation are applied to contract law, and
not by fiduciary principles that would usually govern.2 In Selmark
Associates, Inc. v. Ehrlich,3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
("SJC") held that Selmark still owed Evan Ehrlich fiduciary duties, even
where shareholder agreements existed, because the employment agreement
had expired, and therefore
the contract did not completely govern Ehrlich's
4
rights as a shareholder.
Selmark Associates, Inc. (Selmark) and Marathon Sales, Ltd.
(Marathon) are both closely held corporations from Massachusetts, and in
September of 2001, Evan Ehrlich entered into a number of written
agreements that, among other things, provided for the gradual sale of
Marathon to Selmark and Ehrlich.5 Although Ehrlich's employment
1 See

Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 505-512

(Mass. 1975) (creating "Donahue test"). A "closely held" corporation is "typified by: (1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." Id. at
511; see Elmalehv. Barlow, No. 042644H, 2005 WL 2373851, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 7,
2005) (applying Donahue test). The court in Donahue ultimately determined that the entity at
issue was a close corporation, which fiduciary duties applied to shareholders in close
corporations, and a breach of fiduciary duties occurred. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519-521;
see also John W. Marshall, Closely Held Conflicts, BOARD OF BAR OVERSEES, OFFICE OF THE
LEGAL COUNSEL (July 2003), available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/closelyheld.htm
(discussing conflicts that arise in closely held corporations).
2 See Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 867 N.E.2d 325, 330-31 (Mass. 2007).
3 5 N.E.3d 923 (Mass. 2014).
4 See Selmark, 5 N.E.3d at 927.
5 Id. at 927 (discussing shareholder agreements each company agreed on). There were a total
of four contracts: a stipulated stock purchase and redemption agreement, a conversion agreement,
an employment agreement and a stock agreement. Id. The employment agreement stipulated that
Ehrlich could be fired without cause. Id. at 928. Additionally, the employment agreement stated
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agreement expired in 2002, he continued to work for Marathon until
Selmark fired him without cause in 2007.6 After his termination, Ehrlich
had yet to cash in his Marathon stock, and remained a minority shareholder
of the company.7 After his termination from Marathon, Ehrlich began
working at a competing firm, where he solicited business from Marathon
customers.8
In 2008, Selmark and Marathon filed a complaint alleging that
Ehrlich breached his fiduciary duties to Marathon by soliciting and
acquiring Marathon principals at his new job. 9 In response, Ehrlich
asserted thirteen counterclaims, which included a claim of breach of
fiduciary duties by Selmark, Marathon, and Elofson. 10 In 2011, the jury
found that Ehrlich breached his fiduciary duties to Selmark, and that
Selmark and Elofson breached their contract and fiduciary duties to Ehrlich
as well." After the judgment was entered in October 2011, both parties
that Ehrlich became the vice-president of Marathon and potentially a director, and that if the
agreement would not extend beyond the initial contract term expiration. Id. at 927-28. The
agreement would terminate and Ehrlich would be required to resign as an officer and director of
Marathon. Id. at 927-28.

See id.at 934. Ehrlich became an employee at-will after the employment expired, and
accordingly could no longer be fired without cause, as set forth in the expired employment
agreement. See id.; see also Brief of the Appellants, Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d
923 (2014) (No. 11333), 2011 WL 10958892, at *2-3 [hereinafter Appellant'sBriej] (discussing
Ehrlich's start as shareholder at Selmark). Throughout the negotiations of the sale of Marathon to
Selmark and Ehrlich, Ehrlich' s job security was an issue of great importance to him. See
6

Appellant'sBrief supra, at *2-3; see also FiduciaryDuties Owed to Minority Shareholders,
MANSOUR, GAVIN, GERLACK & MANOS Co., L.P.A. (May 30, 2013),

http://www.mggmlpa.com/News.aspx?id-1 Gb2rxz24ECHeAFS9QM5_g (discussing at-will
employment of minority shareholders in close corporations).
7 Selmark, 5 N.E.3d at 929 (noting Ehrlich's lack of access to, or involvement in, business
operations of Marathon). Ehrlich acquired approximately $25,000 in severance from Selmark
after his termination, but did not cash in his Marathon shares as offered in the termination letter.
See id

8 See id. at 930 (discussing Ehrlich's termination and Ehrlich's approximately $25,000 in
severance from Selmark); Appellant's Brief supra note 6, at *2 (acknowledging that a dispute
arose after Ehrlich's termination). After the dispute, Ehrlich began working as a salesperson with
Tiger Electronics ("Tiger"), a competing manufacturer's representative company, where Ehrlich
met with several Marathon principals, in an attempt to solicit their business. See Selm ark, 5
N.E.2d at 930.
9 Selmark, 5 N.E.2d at 931 (stating damage awards of both parties).
10 See id. (recognizing David Elofson as owner of Selmark at time).
11 See id. (discussing jury determinations). As for Selmark and Marathon's complaints, the
jury found that Ehrlich did breach his fiduciary duty to Selmark and Marathon, and awarded
$240,000 in damages to Selmark and Marathon. See id. In regard to Ehrlich's breach of contract
counterclaims, the jury found that Selmark and Elofson (but not Marathon) did breach the
contract and awarded Ehrlich $1,537,163 in damages. See id. Furthermore, the jury found
Selmark and Elofson (but not Marathon) breached their fiduciary duties to Ehrlich, and awarded
$221,408 in damages to him. See id. Lastly, the jury determined that the Selmark parties
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filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, among other
motions, but all were denied. 12 In January 2012, both parties crossappealed, and the SIC granted Ehrlich's application for direct appellate
1

review.

13

In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court delivered its landmark
decision in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.,
holding that shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties to the
other shareholders in the corporation. 14 In Donahue, the court looked to the
(including Marathon) violated the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, chapter 93A,
engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, awarding $221,408 in damages. See
(awarding double damages and attorney's fees pursuant to 93A); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
93A (2012) (allowing award of double or treble damages for violations).
12 See Selmark, 5 N.E.2d at 931 (explaining post-judgment motions).
Additionally,

by
id.
ch.

the
Selmark parties filed a joint motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("judgment
n.o.v.") and a motion to amend the judgment by remittitur or alternatively for new trial. See id.
Both parties' post-trial motions were denied. See id.
13 See id. at 931-32.
14 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975) ("Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the
trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close
corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another."); see also Cainv. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650, 656 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1975) (holding that shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties to each other
and corporation). The court also articulated that partnership law should be consulted in
adjudicating issues regarding duties owed by shareholders in close corporations. See Cain, 334
N.E.2d at 655; see also Paul J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder FiduciaryDuties,
33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 175, 177-78 (2004) (stating that Massachusetts initiated the application of
fiduciary duties to shareholders in close corporations); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's
Cause ofAction for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699, 726-38 (1993) (discussing remedy options
for oppressed minority shareholders in close corporations). The Donahue court "explored this
duty by examining the difficulty that a minority shareholder will have in challenging dividend
and employment policies under traditional principles, recognizing that the lack of a market traps a
minority shareholder in a disadvantageous situation." Thompson, supra, at 726-27; see James M.
Van Vliet & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for ShareholdersCaughtin a
Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 239, 248 (1998) ("[T]he law of partnership
reflects the broader law of principal and agent, under which every agent is a fiduciary."). "The
general rule has been sufficiently developed to establish that the fiduciary duty will not depend on
shareholder control, but rather arises out of the nature of a closely held corporation." Van Vliet &
Snider, supra, at 251.
The heightened fiduciary duty owed by shareholders appears to be the 'Golden Rule'
in a corporate setting or, perhaps more accurately but still biblical, a rule to make each
shareholder his brother or sister shareholder's keeper. At the heart of this broad,
somewhat vaguely defined standard is the basic idea that in such an interdependent
situation, a shareholder should not seek a benefit at the expense of any of the other
shareholders, this obviously being a duty different from - and more demanding than the one generally owed by a controlling shareholder to other shareholders.
In addition to breaches of what is essentially a duty of loyalty, as illustrated by a
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strong similarities of closely held corporations and partnerships, and
determined that shareholders in close corporations are similar to partners in
that they owe a duty of good faith and fairness to each other.' 5
Additionally, the court determined that fiduciary duties should be applied
to shareholders in close corporations, because of the few remedies that
oppressed shareholders in close corporations have.' 6
In contrast, in Chokel v.Genzyme Corp.,17 the SIC held that when
the rights of shareholders are provided by agreements between the
shareholders, these rights are to be determined by contract law.' 8 In

shareholder competing with his corporation in the Hagshenas case, at least three other
typical factual situations can be identified as violations of the heightened fiduciary duty
owed by shareholders in closely held corporations, or at least in those that are 'close
corporations':
1. Unequal (disproportionate) treatment. Relief may be obtained when a shareholder is
shown to be deprived, by action taken by other shareholders, of his or her proportionate
share of the financial benefits generated by the corporation.
2. Frustration of reasonable expectations. Relief may be obtained when it is shown that
the reasonable expectations of a shareholder with respect to his or her involvement in
the corporation have been blocked by action taken by other shareholders.
3. Freeze out/squeeze out. Relief may be obtained when it is shown that there is
overbearing, heavy handed conduct to literally force a particular shareholder out of the
corporation, by coercing the shareholder to sell his or her shares (usually at a
disadvantageous price) or by barring the shareholder's participation in the corporation
without a sale of shares.
Id. at 252.
15 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (noting shareholders rely on trust and confidence which
makes fiduciary duties applicable).
16 See id. at 513 (noting vulnerability of minority shareholders in close corporations). The
court explained that fiduciary duties apply because of trust and confidence relied upon by each
shareholder. See id. at 515. Additionally, the resemblance of close corporations to partnerships
supports the court's application of fiduciary duties to close corporations. See id.; see also Note,
Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1630, 1641-42 (1961) (discussing
minority shareholder freeze-outs).
Equitable relief is generally more suitable in close
corporations in contrast to remedies for minority shareholders in public corporations. See Note,
supra, at 1641. One reason for the difference of relief given to minority shareholders in close
corporations and public corporations is because a minority shareholder in close corporations tends
to own a greater proportion of shares than a minority shareholder in a public corporation, and is
typically more involved in the corporation as a director of officer as well. See id. The absence of
a market for shares in close corporations causes difficulties and little options for an oppressed
minority shareholder. See id.
17 867 N.E.2d 325 (Mass. 2007).
1 Chokel, 867 N.E.2d at 330-31 (discussing application of fiduciary duties with articles of
organization). The SJC held that the procedure for exchanging stocks fell exactly within the
contract, and any obligations the directors owed to Chokel must be consistent with the terms
provided for in the corporations articles of incorporation. See id. The scope of fiduciary duties
"isonly as broad as the contract that governs the particular relationship[;] the covenant does not
supply terms that the parties were free to negotiate, but did not, nor does it create rights and duties
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Chokel, the court held that where the procedure for exchanging shares was
directly expressed in the contract, any obligations of the directors were to
be determined strictly by the terms agreed to in the articles. 19 Like in
Merriam v. Demoulas Super Markets., Inc. 20 the Selmark court stated,
"when the challenged conduct at issue in a case is clearly contemplated by
the terms of the parties' written agreements, we have declined to find
liability for breach of fiduciary duty. "21
Selmark applies King v. Driscol122 and Blank v. Chelmsford
Ob/Gyn, P.C.,23 where the SJC held that if a director's actions fall
completely within the agreement(s), then fiduciary principles do not
apply. 24 However, a contract between shareholders and directors does not
"completely relieve" them of their fiduciary duties.25 Therefore, in order
for rights and obligations provided by contract between shareholders to be

not otherwise provided for in the contract."

omitted).

Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks and citation

19 See id. at 331 (discussing applicability of fiduciary duties in this instance).

The court

ultimately held that the procedure in question fell "squarely within the contract," and any
obligations owed were limited by the terms contractually agreed to. See id. "Under
Massachusetts' law, a corporation's articles of organization form a contract between the
corporation and its shareholders." Id. at 329.
20 985 N.E.2d 388 (Mass. 2013).
21 See Selmark Assoc., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d 923, 933 (Mass. 2014) (discussing
application of fiduciary duties to contracts). "Although a shareholder in a close corporation
always owes a fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders, good faith compliance with the terms of an
agreement entered into by the shareholders satisfies that fiduciary duty." Merriam, 985 N.E.2d at
395 ("A claim for breach of fiduciary duty may arise only where the agreement does not entirely
govern the shareholder's actions.").
22 638 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 1994).
23 649 N.E.2d 1102 (Mass. 1995).
24 Blank, 649 N.E.2d at 1105 (articulating implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
between parties to a contract). The court also noted that employment contracts contain this
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith may
constitute a breach of the contract. See id. at 1105-06 ("[T]he fact that a stockholder has entered
into employment agreement or fact that stockholders execute valid stock purchase agreement
does not relieve stockholders of high fiduciary duty owed to one another in all their mutual
dealings."); see also Evangelista v. Holland, 537 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Mass. 1989) (citing Donahue
in consideration of breach of shareholder agreement). "Questions of good faith and loyalty do not
arise when all the stockholders in advance enter into an agreement for the purchase of stock of a
withdrawing or deceased stockholder." Evangelista, 537 N.E.2d at 593.
25 See King, 638 N.E.2d at 586 (holding that employment agreement entered into replaced
shareholders' fiduciary duties); see also Blank, 649 N.E.2d at 1106 (discussing terms of
employment agreement in application to shareholder's termination). The court held that the
termination of the shareholder was valid, as the other shareholders strictly abided by the
employment agreement, which provided for the other shareholder's termination without cause.
See Blank, 649 N.E.2d at 1106 (noting plaintiff received six-months' notice as provided in
employment agreement).
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supplanted by fiduciary duties, the contracts must not "entirely govern" the
parties' rights and obligations at issue. 26 The SI
SIC aagain looked to the
Donahue precedent, focusing on "the relationship among shareholders in a
,,27
close corporation.
In Selmark Associates., Inc. v. Ehrlich, the SIC determined that
although Ehrlich and Marathon had three effective shareholder agreements,
these agreements did not cover Ehrlich's employment sufficient enough to
supersede the fiduciary duties imposed on shareholders in a close
corporation. 28 Selmark considered the Blank precedent and distinguished it
from Blank, because unlike in Blank, the expired employment agreement
here was no longer in force.29 Pointing to King and Merriam, the court
reiterated the premise that the mere existence of a contract does not
absolutely release shareholders from their fiduciary duties, and that the
agreements must sufficiently dictate the rights and obligations at issue.30
Accordingly, since there was no effective agreement governing Ehrlich's
employment at the time Ehrlich was fired, the SIC held that Selmark's
termination of Ehrlich was controlled by fiduciary principles. 31 Lastly, the
court looked to consider whether Selmark actually had a genuine reason for
firing Ehlrich, and ultimately found that Selmark did not have a valid basis
for Ehrlich's termination.3 2
In Selmark, the SIC rightfully ensured that the issue at hand was
sufficiently provided for by contract, before automatically applying
contract law because of the existence of agreements between the parties.33
Although previous decisions have held that shareholder agreements might
replace fiduciary duties, the court held that the matter at issue must be
sufficiently addressed in the agreements in order to replace the
26 See Blank, 649 N.E.2d at 1105-06.
27

See id. at 1105 (noting resemblance of close corporations and partnerships).

The court

explained that shareholders' relationships "must be one of trust, confidence, and absolute loyalty
if the enterprise is to succeed." Id.
28 See Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d 923, 934 (Mass. 2014) (holding that
fiduciary duties still applied as result of no operative employment agreement).
29 See id. (comparing applicability of fiduciary duties to shareholder agreements in Blank).
30 See id. (stating that agreement must "entirely govern" parties' rights and obligations).
31 See id. (noting applicability of fiduciary duties).
32 See id. at 935 (concluding that Selmark did not have "cause" for firing Ehrlich). The court
found that "[t]here was no evidence of poor performance Ehrlich was consistently the second
highest producer of commission revenue in the company or of an inability to get along with
others." Id. Also, the court determined that Selmark did not have a "legitimate business purpose
for his termination." Id. (citing O'Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 2007)). Selmark
could have "sought less harmful alternatives before resorting to termination." Id.
33 See Selmark, 5 N.E.3d at 934 (ensuring agreed upon terms existed in written agreement
before applying common law contract principles to agreement).
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shareholders' fiduciary duties.3 4 This decision by the SJC now provides
minority shareholders in close corporations more security, in that majority
shareholders must be much more cautious in situations where it appears
that a "freeze out" of the minority shareholder has occurred or is
impending.35 Minority shareholders in close corporations are particularly
more susceptible to freeze outs compared to those in other types of entities
because there is no ready market for their shares. 36 Thus, when issues 3may
7
arise within the corporation, minority shareholders' options are limited.
The general notion that fiduciary duties apply to shareholders will
undoubtedly see further evolution in the future, and therefore attorneys
must stay afloat on the continued development of the law regarding close
corporations.38 Even more specifically, courts will again be asked to
address conflicts that arise regarding fiduciary duties when a shareholder
enters into specific contractual provisions governing his/her rights and
obligations.39 In representing injured shareholders, future litigators must
make sure to direct the court's attention closely to the relationship of the
agreements and the issue in dispute. Since roughly 90% of companies in
the U.S. are close corporations, litigation regarding shareholders in these
corporations will not be going away any time soon. 40 Since it is generally
suggested that shareholders in close corporations have shareholder and
34 See id (requiring matter to be well developed in shareholder agreement to supersede
fiduciary duties). "Because Blank is inapplicable, and general fiduciary principles apply,
Selmark' s argument that the breach of fiduciary duty claim fails as a matter of law must itself fail,

and the trial judge did not err in denying Selmark's motion for judgment n.o.v. Our standard for
reviewing a motion for judgment n.o.v. is whether, anywhere in the evidence, from
whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [other party]." Id. at 934-35 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see supra notes 20-25 (discussing how previous decisions treatment of
employment agreements impact on fiduciary duties).
31 Selmark, 5 N.E.3d at 932-33 (noting "[fIreeze-outs can occur when a minority shareholder

is deprived of employment").
36

See supra note 14 (summarizing law of applying fiduciary duties to shareholders in close

corporations).
37 See supra note 14.
38 See Vliet & Snider, supra note 14, at 248 ("The shareholder-fiduciary rule is by no means
a finished or perfect concept...."). Judicial and legislative action will be needed in the future, in
order to further evolve and improve the approach to these fiduciary duty issues. See id at 264.
39 See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-6 (1995); see also
Appellant's Brief supra note 6, at *1 ("[Court was] once again asked to address questions that

recurrently arise when a claimed conflict exists between general notions of fiduciary duty and
specific contractual provisions governing shareholder rights in close corporations.").
40

Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises Questions: What Does

'Closely Held' Me an?, WALL ST. JOURNAL. (June 30, 2014), available at
http://online.wsj .com/articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-held-mean1404154577.
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employment agreements even before incorporation, it is almost inevitable
that issues regarding these agreements will arise in the future.
Furthermore, as issues regarding fiduciary duties and shareholder
agreements will continue to occur in closely held corporations, it is also

likely that these issues will arise in the very similar type of entity-the
LLC.42 The SJC has already held that members of LLCs owe fiduciary
duties to each other, and therefore litigation regarding the relationship
between fiduciary duties and agreements between the LLC and members
will likely come to fruition as well. 43 As guidance for future litigators
representing either shareholders, close corporations, or LLCs and its
members, they all must urge the court to focus on the instrumentality of the

terms and matter in dispute, in conjunction with the agreement(s) all
together.44 Attorneys must consider whether the matter in dispute is amply
considered in the agreements enough 4to supplant the fiduciary duties that
each shareholder owes to each other. It will be helpful to see an opinion
411

41 See Marshall, supra note 1 (discussing continuing legal issues involving closely held
corporations and fiduciary duties of shareholders); see also Brent Nicholson, The FiduciaryDuty
Of Close Corporation Shareholders:A Call For Legislation, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 513, 533 (1992)
(endorsing and promoting written shareholder agreements). "A shareholder agreement permits
the parties to write their own rules about dividend policy, employment, management, shareholder
use of corporate assets, dissolution, and other matters." See Nicholson, supra, at 532.
42 See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: Learning
(Or Not) From Close CorporationHistory, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 883, 895 (2005) (analyzing
minority shareholder oppression in close corporations and LLCs). "[Tihe problem of oppression
is 'portable' to the LLC context, as the LLC shares certain core features of the close corporation."
See id. at 896.
43 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 63(b) (2012) (stating members may limit their
fiduciary duties by contract); see also Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816-17 (Mass. 2009)
(holding other members of LLC violated their fiduciary duties toward president-member). The
SJC concluded that where the president-member of LLC owning forty-three percent of business
was subject to a freeze-out by two members collectively owning fifty-one percent, the two
members violated their fiduciary duties in relation to their employment agreement. See Pointer,
918 N.E.2d at 814-16 (noting secret hiring of replacement for then president-member before
attempts at resolution prior to termination); see also One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith, 920
N.E.2d 303, 306-7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (holding breach of fiduciary duties by members in
LLC); 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORP AND LLCs: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5:1 (Rev. 3d ed.) (discussing operating agreements in LLCs). The reach of operating
agreements is broader than those in close corporations. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra.
44 See Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d 923, 934 (Mass. 2014).
45 See id.(holding "tenms of a contract must clearly and expressly indicate a departure from
those obligations"). The court held that although there were brief references to the expired
employment agreement in the three valid shareholder agreements, it was not enough to hold the
agreements operative regarding Ehrlich's employment. See id.("[N]one of the three agreements
contains terms that address in any way Ehrlich's employment rights upon expiration of his
Marathon employment agreement before conversion of his Marathon stock."); see also Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975) (stipulating
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by a Massachusetts appellate court that gives perhaps a more precise
illustration of what the Massachusetts legal and business realm must focus
on when determining the status and legitimacy of shareholder agreements
in regard to certain matters that may otherwise be governed by fiduciary
duty principles.46
In Selmark Associates., Inc. v. Ehrlich, the SIC set forth that
although there may be shareholder agreements between the shareholders,
there must be an examination of these agreements in determining whether
or not fiduciary duty principles still apply to the shareholders' rights and
obligations. The court demonstrated that it is important to look at the
agreements closely and to determine whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the matter in dispute and the shareholder agreements.
In light of these cases, we now know that neither closely held corporations
nor majority shareholders can contract away fiduciary obligations - even
when they think that contract law protects them - if the contracts do not
entirely govern the parties' rights and obligations. Both the legal and
business world can look forward to future decisions by Massachusetts
courts that hopefully dictate with precision what shareholders in close
corporations can expect with regard to their shareholder agreements and
potential applicable fiduciary duties.
Miniard CulpepperJr.

that fiduciary duties apply to shareholders in close corporations).
46 See Selmark, 5 N.E.3d at 934.

